In the second half of the 4th century BCE, the Romans began aggressively consolidating power and territory in Italy. Their rapid expansion forced neighboring independent and autonomous city-states to deliberate over the existential question of whether they should willingly submit to Rome or if they should attempt to resist the Romans on the battlefield. Those who decided to oppose Rome at that time often forged alliances with the Samnites, a powerful federation of Oscan-speaking tribes that controlled a large territory around the Apennine Mountain range in central Italy. Although they were powerful, the Samnites lost to the Romans during the course of the First Samnite War (343–341 BCE), after which Rome absorbed the land of the Campanian League. Rome then went on to solidify power in its heartland by crushing opponents during the Latin War (340–338 BCE), resulting in the cities of Latium being placed within Roman territory and citizenry. Roman conquests and annexations, in addition to a renewed wave of intrusive colonization, caused concern, anger, and fear among the leaders of Rome’s remaining neighbors in Italy. Around 327 BCE, Greek warriors from Palaepolis (near Neapolis) poured proverbial oil on the fire by raiding Roman territory in Campania, which provoked a declaration of war from Rome. The Samnites came to Palaepolis’ aid, forcing nearby city-states and peoples such as the Lucanians, Apulians, Nolani, Vestini, and the citizens of Neapolis to deliberate over whether they should join Rome, attempt to stay neutral, or openly align with the Samnites against the Romans. Of those mentioned, the Lucanians and Apulians decided to work with Rome for the time being, while the Vestini remained neutral. In contrast, Neapolis and the Nolani joined with Palaepolis and the Samnites.
Around 327 BCE, Rome mobilized forces and dispatched armies against Palaepolis and the Samnite land of Samnium, with the then consuls Lucius Cornelius Lentulus and Quintus Publilius Philo leading the armies. A brief period of political chaos occurred in Rome when the consuls’ term of office expired, but the Roman senate decided to allow the former consuls to remain in command of the armies while new leadership was elected in Rome. A brief dictatorship by Marcus Claudius Marcellus was quickly succeeded by an interregnum (a temporary council set up to govern until elections were held), and finally two new consuls, Gaius Poetelius and Lucius Papirius Mugillanus, were elected for the new year.
Most of the campaigning during Rome’s war against Palaepolis occurred in 326 BCE. Former consul Quintus Publilius Philo reportedly marched his army between Palaepolis and Neapolis, two Greek-populated cities in Italy with ties to the Greek colony of Cumae. Before Publilius and the Romans could implement a functioning siege of Palaepolis, Samnite and Nolani reinforcements were able to join the defenders within the city walls. These events were reported by the Roman historian, Livy (c. 59 BCE-17 CE), who wrote, “Publilius reported that two thousand soldiers from Nola and four thousand Samnites had been given entry to Palaepolis…Publilius had already occupied a convenient site between Palaepolis and Neapolis, and had deprived the enemy of the mutual sharing of assistance which they had made use of as one place or the other was in difficulties” (Livy, History of Rome, 8.23).
The amassed forces at Palaepolis posed a serious obstacle to Quintus Publilius Philo and his Roman army. Yet, Palaepolis’ formidable defenses were undermined by tension and infighting between the different peoples who were trapped together during the siege. Ancient Roman historical tradition was not certain on who betrayed whom first, but a serious wedge formed between the citizen of Palaepolis and their allies, the Samnites and Nolani. As the siege ground on, internal infighting evidently became unbearable and the different factions became treacherous toward each other.
According to the historian Livy, the foremost storyline of what happened was that the leaders of Palaepolis decided it would be in their best interest to lay down their arms and capitulate to Rome. Nevertheless, they feared that the thousands of Samnites and Nolani present in the city would react violently if the topic was submitted for deliberation among the allies. Therefore, fearing the response of their partners, the leaders of Palaepolis decided to clandestinely orchestrate the surrender on their own. As the story goes, one leader named Charilaus was put in charge of secretly meeting with the Roman army leadership, while another man, named Nymphius, was tasked with keeping the Samnites and Nolani distracted, while also trying to have them relocate their forces to disadvantageous positions.
Charilaus successfully slipped out unnoticed from Palaepolis and survived making contact with the Roman camp. After identifying himself as a representative of the city, the conspirator was allowed to meet the commanding officer of the Roman army, Quintus Publilius Philo. Once in audience with the general, Charilaus reported that the people of Palaepolis were ready to surrender and that they would be willing to turn on the Samnites and Nolani to end the siege. In exchange, all that Charilaus asked was for the people of Palaepolis to be shown mercy. Publilius Philo agreed to the envoy’s proposal, and the two concocted a plan for Charilaus to secretly smuggle a large contingent of Roman warriors into the city.
Charilaus’ co-conspirator, Nymphius, was also making progress back in Palaepolis. As the story goes, Nymphius was able to keep the Samnites and Nolani thoroughly distracted and confused. But most importantly, he was able to convince the Samnite commander that it was the opportune time for their forces to sneak out to the docks and ready the ships for a sea raid against Rome. Following this advice, the bulk of the Samnite defenders reportedly walked out to the coast, without their equipment, with the aim of preparing the ships for departure. It was at this time that Charilaus returned and secretly ushered Roman warriors into the main citadel of the city. On this, Livy wrote:
“While Nymphius was killing time in the dark and deliberately issuing conflicting orders to confuse the men, whose large numbers were also proving a hindrance, Charilaus was let into the city by his fellow-conspirators as arranged, and after occupying the citadel with Roman soldiers, ordered them to raise a cheer. Hearing this, the Greeks stayed quiet, as instructed by their leaders, but the Nolani rushed out of the city in the opposite direction by the road which leads to Nola. The Samnites, being cut off from the town, had the advantage of an easier escape but one which appeared in a more disgraceful light once the danger was over. Unarmed, with everything abandoned to the enemy, they returned home destitute, stripped of all they had, a laughing stock to their own people as well as to strangers. I am aware of the alternative tradition, whereby the betrayal of Palaepolis is ascribed to the Samnites, but have chosen to follow the more reliable authorities; furthermore, the treaty with Neapolis—where the Greeks transferred their centre of administration from then on—makes it seem more probable that they renewed their friendship with Rome of their own accord” (Livy, History of Rome, 8.26).
As the quote conveys, the Roman siege of Palaepolis was hastened by treachery, either by the people of the city betraying their allies, or by the Nolani and Samnites abandoning the people of Palaepolis. For Livy, he was partial to the account of Palaepolis orchestrating its own surrender to Rome in 326 BCE. Whatever the case, the Nolani and Samnites withdrew from the region during the incident, causing Neapolis to join its sister-city, Palaepolis, in submitting to Rome.
Although the battle for Palaepolis was over, the overall war between the Romans and the Samnites had just begun. In the immediate aftermath of Rome’s expansion into Palaepolis and Neapolis, the Tarentines became hostile to Rome and they lured the Lucanians back into the Samnite alliance. Similarly, the powerful coalition of the Vestini, Marsi, Paeligni and Marrucini people also allied with the Samnites against Rome. In effect, Palaepolis was a spark that ignited a much larger conflict. Rome’s Second [or Great] Samnite War (326–304 BCE) was underway.
Written by C. Keith Hansley
Picture Attribution: (Cropped section of A Roman Battle, by Simon Peter Tilemann (1601 – ), [Public Domain] via Creative Commons and the National Museum of Stockholm).
Sources:
- The History of Rome (Rome and Italy) by Livy, translated by Betty Radice. New York: Penguin Classics, 1982.
- https://www.britannica.com/place/ancient-Rome/The-Latin-League
- https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/classical-quarterly/article/abs/fiveday-interregnum-in-the-roman-republic/0EBEC44DCC8C90C719A8FBE08E7F4189


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